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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 7, 2007, the U.S. federal bank regulators
(Agencies) published final rules' (Final Rules) to implement the
Basel II advanced internal ratings-based approach to bank capital
adequacy in the United States. The Final Rules are based on the
capital standards adopted by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS), which is a committee of the Bank of
International Settlements (BIS), located in Basel, Switzerland.
BCBS consists of senior representatives of bank supervisory
authorities and central banks around the world. In 1988, BCBS
published an Accord entitled International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel I). That Accord
formed the basis for the risk-based capital standards adopted by
bank regulators in member and many non-member countries.
Under these standards, a bank's assets are grouped into several
categories based on the type of obligor (or obligation) and then
risk-weighted. The risk weights range from 0% to 100%. Off-
balance sheet liabilities are first converted into on-balance sheet
items by application of a credit conversion factor and then risk-
weighted based on the type of obligor.
While Basel I was viewed as a useful and beneficial device
in encouraging banking institutions to maintain regulatory capital
commensurate with credit (and later market) risks in their banking
books, a consensus gradually emerged among the BIS member
financial regulators and the banking industry that the standards of
Basel I were not sufficiently risk-sensitive. In June 1999, BCBS
1. Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework -
Basel II, 72 Fed. Reg. 69,288 (Dec. 7, 2007) [hereinafter Adopting Release] (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 225, 325, 559, 560, 563, 567), available at http://a257.
g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/O1jan20071800/edocket.acess.gpo.gov/2007/pdf/07-
5729.pdf. For ease of reference, this Article will refer to both the Adopting Release
and the adopted sections using this citation. Relevant sections will be noted in
parentheses (e.g., section 42(e)) and cited to the Common Appendix listed in the
Federal Register. The Agencies include the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
and the Office of Thrift Supervision.
2. For example, under Basel I almost all claims on private sector entities are
risk-weighted at 100%, without regard to the rating or any other characteristic of the
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announced that it was working on a new risk-based capital
framework to replace the 1988 Accord. After years of
international consultation, BCBS adopted a new Accord (Basel II)
in June 2004,' which is designed to be significantly more risk-
sensitive across various types of banking assets, including
securitization exposures.
Although many other countries, including the members of
the European Union, started the process of implementation of the
new Accord almost immediately after BCBS adopted it, in the
United States, the Agencies did not make substantial progress on
this matter for a period of time due to disagreements among
themselves, as well as between them and the industry, on various
issues, including the transitional timetable, the permissible level of
capital reduction during the transitional period, and the options
under Basel II that should be available to U.S. banks. These issues
also raised uncertainty about Basel II in the Congress, which
expressed its concerns and positions through various hearings that it
held on the consequences of adopting the proposed rules. The
Agencies ultimately resolved these issues through cooperation and
consultation with the industry and the Congress, and on September
25, 2006, they published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPR)' to
implement Basel II in the United States. After consideration of the
comments received from the public, they published the Final Rules
on December 7, 2007, with compliance to start on April 1, 2008.'
In this Article, we summarize the portions of the Final
Rules that apply to banks' 6 securitization exposures, including both
traditional and synthetic securitizations. We focus on the
obligor.
3. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL
STANDARDS (2006) [hereinafter BASEL II], available at www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl28.pdf.
4. Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework, 71
Fed. Reg. 55,830 (Sept. 25, 2006) [hereinafter NPR] (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts.
3, 208, 225, 566).
5. For further information on the process leading to the of adoption of the Final
Rules, see the Basel II sections of the Agencies' websites, including the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (available at www.federalreserve.gov/
generalinfo/basel2/default.htm) and the Office of the Comptroller of Currency
(available at www.occ.treas.gov/law/basel.htm).
6. In this Article, we use the term "bank" to refer to any depository institution
or bank holding company.
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minimum capital requirements - the "first pillar" of Basel II - as
opposed to the supervisory review process and market discipline
(the second and third pillars). Within the minimum capital
requirements, the Final Rules deal only with the credit risk or
banking book component. The Agencies have indicated that final
rules to update the market risk or trading book rules will be issued
in the near future.7
Parts II and III of this Article provide general information
on Basel II and the threshold issue of what is a "securitization
exposure." Parts IV through VI then summarize the aspects of the
Final Rules that are most relevant to banks as investors in asset-
backed securities, originators of securitized assets, and participants
in the asset-backed commercial paper conduit market,
respectively. Part VII discusses credit risk mitigation techniques in
the securitization context generally, and Part VIII discusses
synthetic securitizations.
Unless otherwise indicated, section references, infra, refer
to sections of the Final Rules.
II. STATUS OF BASEL II
A. Scope and Approaches
Basel II is meant to be applied "on a consolidated basis to
internationally active banks., 8 It provides two broad methods for
calculating minimum capital requirements relating to credit risk:
* a "standardized approach," which relies heavily upon
external credit assessments by major independent credit
rating agencies; and
* an internal ratings-based (IRB) approach, which
permits a bank to use some internal assessments in
determining its required capital. The securitization
7. Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 69,289. The notice of proposed
rulemaking relating to the new market risk rules appeared at Risk-Based Capital
Standards: Market Risk, 71 Fed. Reg. 55,958 (Sept. 25, 2006) [hereinafter Market
Risk NPR].
8. BASEL II, supra note 3, 20. Holding companies for internationally active
banking groups will also be covered. Id. 21.
[Vol. 12
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framework within the IRB approach also relies heavily
upon external credit assessments by rating agencies.
Within Basel II as a whole, a further distinction is made
between a "foundation" IRB approach and a more "advanced"
IRB approach. That distinction does not, however, apply to the
securitization framework, where there is a single IRB approach.
A few years ago, the Agencies tentatively decided that only
the advanced IRB approach would be implemented in the United
States. However, in response to comments on the NPR, the
Agencies announced in July 2007 that they had changed their
minds and will also implement the standardized approach. The
standardized approach will take the place of the so-called "Basel
IA" rules that were proposed in December 2006. 9 The U.S. rules
implementing the standardized approach will go through an
administrative rulemaking process similar to the process used to
adopt the Final Rules. The Agencies expect to issue the
standardized approach proposal in the first quarter of 2008. The
foundation IRB approach still will not be used in the United
States.
The Final Rules relate only to the advanced IRB approach
and break banks up into three categories: (i) "core banks," which
are large or internationally active banks ° that would be required
to adopt the new framework; (ii) "opt-in banks," which do not
meet the size thresholds for mandatory adoption but decide
voluntarily (and with supervisory approval) to adopt the new
9. In light of the complexity of Basel II, as compared to Basel I, the Agencies
decided to limit the scope of its U.S. implementation, and propose an alternative set
of rules for U.S. banks not subject to Basel II, which would be more risk sensitive
than Basel I, but simpler than Basel II to implement. This version, known as Basel
IA, 71 Fed. Reg. 77,446 (Dec. 26, 2006), differed from Basel I in several respects,
including a more extensive use of external credit ratings. Basel IA drew heavily on
the BIS standardized approach, but was different from those standards in various
respects, including not having a capital charge for operational risk.
10. A bank will be a core bank if it has consolidated total assets of $250 billion or
more and/or consolidated total on-balance sheet foreign exposure of $10 billion or
more. A bank holding company is also a "core bank" if it meets either or both of
these tests or if it has any bank subsidiary that is a core bank. If a bank holding
company is a core bank, then so are all of its bank subsidiaries (subject to an ability
of the principal supervisor to permit some such subsidiaries to opt out of the Final
Rules in appropriate circumstances). Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 69,397
(section 1(b)).
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framework; and (iii) "general banks," which do not adopt the new
framework and will remain subject to the currently existing
domestic risk-based capital framework or may opt into the
standardized approach, once adopted. In this respect, the United
States is diverging from its implementation of the original Basel
Accord, which applied to all banks.
B. Timing
Basel II sets out a time frame for adoption by member
countries, but implementation in the United States is lagging
behind the Basel II schedule. Both the Basel II time frame for the
IRB approach and the U.S. time frame contemplate:
* one or more years of parallel calculation, in
which a bank would remain subject to the
existing risk-based capital rules but also calculate
its risk-based capital requirements under the
new framework; and
* two or three transition years, during which a
bank would be subject to the new framework,
but the bank's minimum risk-based capital
would be subject to a floor based on a
percentage of what would have been required
under the prior framework.
[Vol. 12
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Above is a comparison of the timelines for the Basel II IRB
approach and U.S. implementation. These time frames apply to
banks that are implementing the applicable new framework at the
earliest possible time. Under the Final Rules, a parallel four year
schedule applies to banks that start to implement the framework
later.
C. Basic Terminology and Mechanics
Basel II and the Final Rules continue to use some of the
same fundamental terminology that was used in the original Basel
Accord and is still used in the current U.S. rules. The mechanics
for measuring a bank's actual capital remain essentially
unchanged, as does the division of capital between tier 1 capital
(which is limited to common stockholders' equity, qualifying
noncumulative perpetual preferred stock, including related
surplus, and minority interest in equity accounts of consolidated
subsidiaries) and tier 2 capital (which encompasses allowances for
loan and lease losses, some additional types of preferred stock and
related surplus, certain hybrid capital instruments, and
subordinated debt). Tier 1 capital must make up at least 50% of a
11. These are the advanced IRB approaches for credit or the advanced
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bank's qualifying capital. For the most part, the Final Rules refer
to existing (and continuing) U.S. rules on these points and do not
change or restate them.
The mechanics for calculating a bank's risk-based capital
requirements vary between four different categories of exposures:
wholesale, retail, securitization, and equity. The mechanics for
determining the risk-based capital requirements for wholesale and
retail exposures will change significantly from the current U.S.
rules. The mechanics for securitization exposures will change less.
Since equities are rarely securitized, we do not discuss the
mechanisms for those exposures.
For the wholesale category, the capital requirement will be
calculated separately for each exposure. A bank will assign four
quantitative risk parameters to each exposure:
" PD (probability of default) - the bank's estimate of the
likelihood that the obligor (or a guarantor) will
default over a one-year horizon;
" LGD (loss given default) - the bank's estimate of the
percentage economic loss that would occur if the
obligor defaults in an economic downturn;
" EAD (exposure at default) - the bank's estimate of the
amount that the obligor would owe the bank at
the time of default; and
" M - the effective remaining maturity of the exposure.
The bank will then input these parameters into an IRB
risk-based capital formula to determine the risk-based capital
requirement for the exposure.
Retail exposures will be divided into three subcategories -
residential mortgage exposures, qualifying revolving exposures
(QREs) (for example, credit cards and overdraft lines) and other
retail exposures. Within these subcategories, banks will group
exposures into segments with similar risk characteristics and
determine risk-based capital requirements for each segment. To
determine the risk-based capital requirement for a segment, a
bank will assign the risk parameters PD, LGD, and EAD to each
[Vol. 12
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segment and input these parameters into an IRB risk-based capital
formula.
A securitization exposure resulting from a securitization of
retail or wholesale exposures will not be analyzed under the
capital rules for retail or wholesale exposures. Instead, a separate
securitization framework will apply. The main reason is that the
Agencies are not comfortable permitting banks to determine the
wholesale or retail risk parameters for securitization exposures.
Because securitizations are tranched exposures to an underlying
pool of exposures, the assessment of risk parameters "would
require implicit or explicit estimates of correlations among the
losses on the underlying exposures and estimates of the credit risk
consequences of tranching."'2 The Agencies believe that, under
current technology, "[s]uch correlation and tranching effects are
difficult to estimate and validate in an objective manner and on a
going-forward basis."'3
Banks will determine risk-based capital requirements for
securitization exposures by multiplying their total risk-weighted
assets in this category times a minimum capital requirement
(8%). 14  The risk-weighted amount of an on-balance sheet
securitization exposure is the product of the amount15 of the
exposure and a "risk weight." There are various methods for
assigning risk weights and a hierarchy16 that determines when each
12. Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 69,357.
13. Id.
14. In order to "maintain the current overall level of minimum risk-based capital
requirements within the banking system," the total credit risk-weighted assets
determined under the IRB approach are also multiplied times a "scaling factor" of
1.06 before multiplying that product times the minimum capital requirement of 8%.
Id. at 69,293, 69,398 (section 2) (definition of "credit risk-weighted assets").
15. In section 42(e)(1), the amount of on-balance sheet securitization exposure
that is not a repo-style transaction, eligible margin loan, or OTC derivative contract
(other than a credit derivative) is defined as: "(i) The [bank]'s carrying value minus
any unrealized gains and plus any unrealized losses on the exposure, if the exposure
is a security classified as available-for-sale; or (ii) The [bank]'s carrying value, if the
exposure is not a security classified as available-for-sale." Id. at 69,419 (section
42(e)(1)).
16. The hierarchy is: (1) deducting gain-on-sale and credit-enhancing interest
only strips from capital; (2) a ratings-based approach, which applies to positions with
external credit ratings or on which such ratings can be inferred; (3) an internal
assessment approach, which applies only to exposures to asset-backed commercial
paper conduits, and a supervisory formula approach; and (4) deduction from capital
for any securitization exposures not covered by any of the other approaches. See
2008]
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method is used. In each case, risk weights are stated as
percentages, which become larger as credit risk increases. In the
ratings-based approach, which is discussed at length, infra, the risk
weights vary from 7% to 1,250%.17 So the risk-weighted amount
of an asset with very high credit quality (and therefore the risk-
based capital requirement) will be less than the risk-weighted
amount of an asset of the same size with lower credit quality.
Under current U.S. rules, off-balance sheet securitization
exposures are multiplied by an additional "credit conversion
factor," and that product (sometimes referred to as a "credit
equivalent amount") is multiplied by a risk weight to determine a
risk-weighted asset amount. The securitization framework in the
Final Rules does not use a "credit conversion factor" or
"conversion factor" concept, except in the provisions relating to
early amortization features (discussed infra Part V.A.4). Under the
original Basel Accord and (to a somewhat lesser extent) the
current U.S. rules, some liquidity facilities for asset-backed
commercial paper (ABCP) conduits have a favorable credit
conversion factor, which has provided a substantial risk-based
capital benefit for conduit programs. Under the Final Rules, that
favorable credit conversion factor is eliminated, though other
aspects may counterbalance the impact of this change. See infra
Part VI.B for a discussion of this point.
D. Principle of Conservatism
The Final Rules incorporate a "principle of conservatism"
that was not included in the NPR. This principle permits banks to
make simplifying assumptions in their risk-based capital
calculations, so long as the simplification increases the capital
requirement. A bank is required to provide prior notice to its
primary regulator before applying the principle and may not apply
it to exposures that are, in the aggregate, material to the bank.
infra Parts IV-VI for further discussion of these approaches.
17. In the table at infra Part III.A of this Article, the "Deduct from tier 1 and tier
2 capital" row equates to a risk weight of 1,250%, since 1,250% times the minimum
capital requirement of 8% equals 100%, meaning that exposures with that risk weight
must be covered completely by capital and cannot be leveraged.
18. Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 69,397 (section 1(d)).
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III. DEFINITION OF SECURITIZATION EXPOSURES
Since the Final Rules provide different rules for calculating
minimum capital requirements for different categories of credit
exposures, the terms used to define those categories are important.
Consistent with Basel II, the Final Rules define "securitization
exposure" as "[a]n on-balance sheet or off-balance sheet credit
exposure that arises from a traditional or synthetic securitization
(including credit-enhancing representations and warranties)."' 9 As
in the NPR, "traditional securitization" and "synthetic
securitization" are then defined mostly in terms of the tranching of
credit risk. In addition, in response to comments on the NPR, the
Agencies modified the definition of "traditional securitization" to
expressly exclude transactions where the underlying exposures are
owned by (1) an operating company, (2) a small business
investment company, (3) certain firms involved in community
development, and (4) other investment firms, based on
determinations by the Agencies. Exceptions (1)-(3) are subject to
override by the Agencies based on a particular transaction's
leverage, risk profile, or economic substance.
19. Id. at 69,404 (section 2) (definition of "securitization exposure"). The
definition proposed in the NPR also specifically included mortgage-backed pass-
through securities guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, regardless of
whether or not they otherwise satisfied the terms of the definition. NPR, supra note
4, at 55,920. That special provision has been deleted.
20081 BASELIH
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Synthetic securitization means a
transaction in which:
All or a portion of the credit risk
of one or more underlying
exposures is transferred to one or
more third parties through the use
of one or more credit derivatives
or guarantees (other than a
guarantee that transfers only the
credit risk of an individual retail
exposure);
Traditional securitization means a
transaction in which:
All or a portion of the credit risk
of one or more underlying
exposures is transferred to one or
more third parties other than
through the use of credit
derivatives or guarantees;
(2) The credit risk associated with the underlying exposures has been
separated into at least two tranches reflecting different levels of
seniority;
(3) Performance of the securitization exposures depends upon the
performance of the underlying exposures; and
(4) All or substantially all of the underlying exposures are financial
exposures (such as loans, commitments, credit derivatives, guarantees,
receivables, asset-backed securities, mortgage-backed securities, other
debt securities, or equity securities).
Apart from these exceptions, the definitions of "synthetic
securitization" and "traditional securitization" both have four
numbered paragraphs, as set out above. 20 Paragraphs (2)-(4) are
identical.
Under these definitions, it might appear that investments in
many auto lease securitizations would not be treated as
securitization exposures, since monetization of lease residuals
arguably violates the requirement that "[a]ll or substantially all of
the underlying exposures are financial exposures." The Agencies
declined to modify that requirement to address the presence of
residuals in lease securitizations, but they did provide helpful
interpretive guidance in the Adopting Release, stating:
Based on their cash flow characteristics, for
purposes of the final rule, the [A]gencies would
20. Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 69,404-05 (section 2) (definition of
"synthetic securitization" and "traditional securitization").
[Vol. 12
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consider many of the asset classes identified by
commenters - including lease residuals and
entertainment royalties - to be financial assets.
Both the designation of exposures as securitization
exposures and the calculation of risk-based capital
requirements for securitization exposures will be
guided by the economic substance of a transaction
rather than its legal form."
Interest rate swaps and other non-credit derivatives with a
securitization SPE as a counterparty are securitization exposures,
but the Final Rules provide a simplified method to risk weight
these exposures in some circumstances.22
IV. BANKS AS INVESTORS IN SECURITIZATION EXPOSURES
Basel II generally treats banks' securitization exposures
consistently, regardless of the capacity in which a bank acquires or
retains a particular exposure. However, as a practical matter the
portions of the Final Rules that are of greatest interest to a bank
will depend on whether the bank is acquiring a securitization
exposure as an investor, securitizing assets as an originator, or
taking on exposures in connection with an ABCP conduit.
Consequently, in this Part IV and the following Parts V and VI,
infra, we summarize much of the substance of the Final Rules
along these lines.
The following discussion applies only to securitization
exposures that a bank holds in its banking book, as opposed to its
trading account. Exposures held in the trading account would
generally be subject to the market risk rules rather than the rules
discussed below. However, under the proposed changes to the
market risk rules, "residual securitization positions" - which are
defined in the proposed market risk rules as any securitization
position that is required to be deducted from capital under the
Final Rules or the parallel existing U.S. capital rules for general
21. Id. at 69,327.
22. Id. at 69,419 (section 42(a)(5)).
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banks 3 - are required to be held in the banking book, subject to a
limited exception for market makers.24
A. Ratings-Based Approach
Under the hierarchy of approaches for calculating capital
under the Final Rules, if a securitization exposure has a rating
from one or more major credit rating agencies, a bank that invests
in that exposure will calculate the associated risk-based capital
requirement under a ratings-based approach (RBA). Since most
securitization exposures that banks would acquire as investors are
rated, the RBA is the main approach of interest to banks acting as
investors. This is consistent with current U.S. risk-based capital
requirements, though Basel II and the Final Rules vary the details
of the RBA significantly from the current U.S. rules.
The following table sets out the main features of the RBA
under the current U.S. rules and the Final Rules. The table uses
S&P rating categories by way of example, but the rules apply
equally to equivalent ratings from the other nationally recognized
statistical rating organizations recognized by the SEC's Division of
Market Regulation.
23. Market Risk NPR, supra note 7, at 55,972.
24. Id. at 55,964.
25. Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 69,401-02 (section 2) (definitions of
"external rating" and "nationally recognized statistical rating organization
(NRSRO)").
[Vol. 12
Risk Weights Under Final Rules
Long Term Current Granular Pool Non-
Ratings Risk Senior Non-Senior Granular
Weights Exposure Exposure Pool
AAA 20% 7% 12% 20%
AA 8% 15% 25%
A+ 10% 18%
A 50% 12% 20% 35%
A- 20% 35%
BBB+ 35% 50%









A-1 20% 7% 12% 20%
A-2 50% 12% 20% 35%
A-3 100% 60% 75% 75%
For investing banks, one rating is sufficient. If there are
multiple ratings on a particular position (including any rating
26inferred as described infra), the lowest solicited rating governs.
The credit rating must cover all payments due on the exposure,
including both principal and interest if the exposure features both
types of payments. Also, the rating must be published in an
accessible form and be included in the transition matrices
published by the rating agency.27
26. Id. at 69,421 (section 43(b)(2)); NPR, supra note 4, at 55,938 (section
43(b)(2)).
27. Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 69,401 (section 2) (definition of "external
rating"). The Final Rules do not implement I 555(d) of Basel II, which requires
banks to apply external ratings "consistently across a given type of securitisation
exposure" and forbids a bank to rely on different rating agencies for external ratings
of different tranches from the same securitization. Presumably the Agencies thought
that the combination of market discipline and supervisory discretion made these anti-
abuse rules unnecessary.
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While the current U.S. rules specify only a single risk
weight for any given rating, the Final Rules (consistent with Basel
II) differentiate within a single rating depending upon the seniority
of the exposure and the granularity of the underlying pool. For
these purposes, a securitization exposure is "senior" if it
has a first priority claim on the cash flows from the
underlying exposures. When determining whether a
securitization exposure has a first priority claim on
the cash flows from the underlying exposures, a
[bank] is not required to consider amounts due
under interest rate or currency derivative contracts,
28fees due, or other similar payments.
In reviewing the NPR, some market participants had wondered
about the effect of time tranching oii seniority. The Adopting
Release addresses this point, indicating that "if multiple tranches
of a securitization share the transaction's highest rating, only the
tranche with the shortest remaining maturity would be treated as
senior, since other tranches with the same rating would not have a
first claim to cash flows throughout their lifetimes.,
29
For purposes of the Final Rules, the granularity of a pool is
determined using an "effective" number of exposures in the pool,
rather than the gross number.3" A pool is treated as granular if its
effective number of exposures is six or greater. The effective-
number-of-exposures approach is meant to
28. Id. at 69,404 (section 2) (definition of "senior securitization exposure").
29. Id. at 69,363.
30. As a general matter, the effective number of exposures (or "N") is calculated
using the formula below, where EAD, represents the exposure at default associated
with the i instrument in the pool of underlying exposures.
(IEAD)2
N = ' 2J"EAD i
Id. at 69,421, 69,424 (sections 43(b)(2) and 45(e)(6)).
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appropriately assess the diversification of pools that
have individual underlying exposures of different
sizes. An approach that simply counts the gross
number of underlying exposures in a pool treats all
exposures in the pool equally. This simplifying
assumption could radically overestimate the
granularity of a pool with numerous small exposures
and one very large exposure. The effective
exposure approach captures the notion that the risk
profile of such an unbalanced pool is more like a
pool of several medium-sized exposures than like a
pool of a large number of equally sized small
31exposures.
Notwithstanding the insight above, the Agencies also
recognize that in most cases the exposures in a securitized pool will
be of generally the same size. The requirement that banks use an
effective number of exposures is largely meant to avoid abuse.
Consequently, the Final Rules generally permit banks to assume
(for this purpose) that the effective number of exposures (referred
to as "N") is six or more if either (a) the notional number of
exposures is twenty-five or more or (b) all of the exposures are
retail exposures. The exception to this general rule, which should
cover the anti-abuse concern, is that a bank is required to actually
calculate N if the bank knows or has reason to know that N is less
than six."
B. Inferred Ratings
Besides explicitly rated exposures, the RBA is also
mandatory for any exposure where a rating can be inferred, as
follows. An inferred rating may (and must) be applied to a
securitization exposure when:
(1) The securitization exposure does not have an
external rating; and
31. Id. at 69,369.
32. Id. at 69,421 (section 43(b)(2)(i)(A)).
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(2) Another securitization exposure issued by the
same issuer and secured by the same underlying
exposures:
(i) Has an external rating;
(ii) Is subordinated in all respects to the unrated
securitization exposure;
(iii) Does not benefit from any credit
enhancement that is not available to the unrated
securitization exposure; and
(iv) Has an effective remaining maturity that is
equal to or longer than that of the unrated
33securitization exposure.
The inferred rating that will apply to the unrated exposure
in these circumstances is the rating on the reference junior rated
exposure.
C. Exceptions to RBA
There is an exception to the RBA for interest-only
mortgage-backed securities. Regardless of their rating, these
securities may never have a risk weight of less than 100%.14 Also,
credit-enhancing interest-only strips are not subject to the RBA
(and must be deducted from capital), regardless of the underlying
asset class.35
V. BANKS AS ORIGINATORS
In addition to the specific securitization framework, the
more general changes in the risk-based capital framework for
retail and wholesale credit exposures under the Final Rules and
Basel II are likely to influence the actions of banks as originators
of securitizations. One of the regulators' explicit goals in the
process of developing Basel II has been to eliminate, or at least
minimize, opportunities for perceived "regulatory arbitrage,"
33. Id. at 69,402 (section 2) (definition of "inferred rating").
34. Id. at 69,420 (section 420)).
35. Id. at 69,419 (section 42(a)(1)).
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where transactions are executed to achieve reductions in capital
requirements that are not supported by commensurate reductions
in the originator's risk position. If and to the extent that
securitizations by banks have been wholly or partially motivated
by regulatory arbitrage, that motivation should be reduced by the
greater risk sensitivity of the new framework.
Whether this will reduce volume or alter issuance patterns
from bank originators remains to be seen, but it seems certain that
banks will continue to access the securitization markets as
originators because of other benefits. For banks that do so, the
Final Rules include qualitative regulations relating to the process
along with the quantitative risk-based capital calculations.
A. Regulating the Securitization Process
The qualitative regulations for originators include
"operational requirements" for traditional and synthetic
securitizations generally, as well as rules relating to a number of
common features in securitizations. The features that are
specifically regulated include clean-up calls, servicer advance
facilities, early amortization facilities, and representations and
warranties. Implicit recourse is also addressed. The operational
requirements for synthetic securitizations are discussed infra Part
VIII.A.
1. Operational Requirements for Traditional Securitizations
Early in the consultative process for Basel II, one of the
consultative documents referred to operational criteria for
traditional securitizations as "requirements for achieving a clean
break. 3 6 That is still very much their flavor. Under the Final
Rules, in order for an originating bank to exclude securitized
assets when calculating its risk-based capital requirements, the
following "operational requirements" must be satisfied:
0 the transfer must be considered a sale under GAAP;
36. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD 87 (2001).
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* the bank must have transferred to third parties credit
risk associated with the transferred assets; and
* any clean-up calls associated with the securitization
must satisfy the requirements discussed infra Part
V.A.2.
These requirements differ in several respects from the
parallel requirements in Basel II. First, Basel II does not require a
sale under applicable accounting rules. It includes a number of
requirements that echo the requirements for sale treatment under
current U.S. GAAP37 but does not actually require sale treatment.
This could become an issue, as the Financial Accounting Standards
Board is expected to propose significant changes to the applicable
accounting standard in 2008. On this point, the Adopting Release
states: "if GAAP in this area were to change materially in the
future, the [A]gencies would reassess, and possibly revise, the
operational standards."38
Second, the U.S. requirement that credit risk be transferred
differs from Basel II, which requires the transfer of "significant"
credit risk. The Adopting Release indicates that prior guidance
provided by the Agencies "to assist banks with assessing the extent
to which they have transferred credit risk and, consequently, may
recognize any reduction in required regulatory capital" will
generally still apply. 9
Third, the Final Rules omit the following additional
requirements that appear in Basel II:
37. Basel II T 554(b) includes requirements that "the transferor does not
maintain effective or indirect control over the transferred exposures" (including by
way of an option to repurchase the exposures) and that the assets are "legally
isolated from the transfer," and 554(d) requires that the holders of beneficial
interests in the SPE that holds the exposures after the transfer must have the right to
pledge or exchange them without restriction. These requirements parallel all or part
of paragraphs 9(c), 9(a) and 9(b), respectively, of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board's Statement No. 140, which sets out the requirements for sale treatment under
U.S. GAAP.
38. Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 69,361.
39. Id. The prior guidance cited is: OCC Bulletin 99-46 (Dec. 14, 1999) (OCC);
FDIC Financial Institution Letter 109-99 (Dec. 13, 1999) (FDIC); SR Letter 99-37
(Dec. 13, 1999) (FRB); CEO Ltr. 99-119 (Dec. 14, 1999) (OTS).
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The securities issued are not obligations of the
transferor. Thus, investors who purchase the
securities only have claim to the underlying pool of
exposures[;]' and
The securitisation does not contain clauses that (i)
require the originating bank to alter systematically
the underlying exposures such that the pool's
weighted average credit quality is improved unless
this is achieved by selling assets to independent and
unaffiliated third parties at market prices; (ii) allow
for increases in a retained first loss position or credit
enhancement provided by the originating bank after
the transaction's inception; or (iii) increase the yield
payable to parties other than the originating bank,
such as investors and third-party providers of credit
enhancements, in response to a deterioration in the
credit quality of the underlying pool.41
The first of these two omitted paragraphs may have been viewed
as redundant with the requirement of a GAAP sale. The Agencies
presumably believe that the issues dealt with in the second omitted
paragraph are adequately addressed by other U.S. guidance.
2. Operational Requirements for Clean-Up Calls
As noted in Part III.A.1, supra, and Part VIII.A, infra, one
of the operational requirements for both traditional and synthetic
securitizations is that any clean-up calls included in the transaction
meet their own operational requirements. Specifically, any clean-
up call must:
(i) Be exercisable solely at the discretion of the
originating bank or servicer;
(ii) Not be structured to avoid allocating losses to
40. BASEL II, supra note 3, T 554(c).
41. Id. 554(f).
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securitization exposures held by investors or
otherwise structured to provide credit enhancement
to the securitization (for example, to purchase non-
performing underlying exposures); and
(iii) (A) For a traditional securitization, be
exercisable only when 10[%] or less of the principal
amount of the underlying exposures or secur-
itization exposures (determined as of the inception
of the securitization) is outstanding. (B) For a
synthetic securitization, be exercisable only when
10[%] or less of the principal amount of the refer-
ence portfolio of underlying exposures (determined
as of the inception of the securitization) is out-
standing.42
The Adopting Release contains the following helpful guidance as
to the application of the 10[%] limit in paragraph (iii)(A) to
master trust issuances:
where a securitization SPE is structured as a master
trust, a clean-up call with respect to a particular
series or tranche issued by the master trust would
meet criteria (iii)(A) and (iii)(B) so long as the
outstanding principal amount in that series was
10[%] or less of its original amount at the inception
of the series.43
3. Servicer Advance Facilities
Another common feature in securitizations that is
specifically regulated by Basel II (and the Final Rules) is the
servicer advance. The Final Rules use the phrase "servicer cash
advance facility" to refer to this feature.44 While these facilities
have traditionally been subject to scrutiny to assure that they did
42. Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 69,399 (section 2) (definition of "eligible
clean-up call").
43. Id. at 69,361.
44. Id. at 69,404 (section 2) (definition of "servicer cash advance facility").
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not act as a credit recourse, 45 Basel II (and the Final Rules) focus
on a different question: whether the servicer should be required to
hold capital against the undrawn portion of any commitment it
may have to make advances. The answer is that a bank is not
required to hold capital against the undrawn portion of an
"eligible servicer cash advance facility, 4 6 but is required to
calculate capital with respect to any cash advance facility that does
not meet the eligibility requirements in the same manner as it
would for any other undrawn securitization exposure.47 In any
case, a servicer is required to hold capital against the outstanding
amount of any advances.
The eligibility requirements for a servicer cash advance
facility are:
(1) The servicer is entitled to full reimbursement of
advances, except that a servicer may be obligated to make
non-reimbursable advances for a particular underlying
exposure if any such advance is contractually limited to an
insignificant amount of the outstanding principal balance of
that exposure;
(2) The servicer's right to reimbursement is senior in right
of payment to all other claims on the cash flows from the
underlying exposures of the securitization; and
(3) The servicer has no legal obligation to, and does not,
make advances to the securitization if the servicer
concludes the advances are unlikely to be repaid.48
These requirements are more stringent than Basel II and
the requirements for "mortgage servicer cash advances" under the
current U.S. rules.49 Under Basel II, only requirements (1) and (2)
apply (although requirement (1) does not have the carve-out for
45. See, e.g., Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Capital Adequacy Guidelines;
Capital Maintenance: Capital Treatment of Recourse, Direct Credit Substitutes and
Residual Interests in Asset Securitizations, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,614, 59,622-23 (Nov. 29,
2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 225, 325, 567) (discussing possible treatment
of servicer advance obligations as recourse or direct credit substitutes).
46. Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 69,420 (section 42(i)).
47. Id. at 69,360.
48. Id. at 69,404 (section 2) (definition of "servicer cash advance facility").
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insignificant non-reimbursable advances). Basel II also allows
national discretion to require no capital against a servicer cash
advance facility that is unconditionally cancelable without prior
notice. 0 The Agencies did not exercise this option in the Final
Rules. The current requirements for mortgage servicer cash
advances also parallel requirements (1) and (2). Neither Basel II
nor the current rules include requirement (3).
4. Early Amortization Features
The Final Rules impose a new "managed assets" capital
charge for revolving credit securitizations that involve early
amortization features. This capital charge applies to the portion of
the securitized assets that has been transferred to investors in an
accounting sale. In effect, this means that the accounting sale is
not fully recognized for risk-based capital purposes. The Agencies
believe that early amortization features place liquidity and other
risks on originating banks that justify additional capital, at least in
some circumstances.
The capital charge functions by applying a conversion
factor to the product of (1) the EAD (exposure at default)
associated with the investor interests, (2) K,B for the underlying
exposures (as discussed infra Part V.B.3) and (3) 12.5. This yields
a risk-weighted asset amount for the investor interests, which
would be included in the bank's aggregate risk-weighted
securitization assets amount.
The conversion factor to be used varies depending on the
specific terms of the early amortization feature and the nature of
the securitized assets. Concerning the terms of the early
amortization feature,51 additional capital will only be required if
the trigger for early amortization relates to either the performance
of the securitized assets or the originating bank. Basel II includes
additional exclusions from the capital charge relating to early
amortization features which do not appear in the Final Rules.
49. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 208 app. A (part III.B.3.a.x) (2007).
50. BASEL II, supra note 3, 582.




These exclusions relate to:
* securitizations with a replenishment structure in which
the individual underlying exposures do not revolve and
the early amortization ends the ability of the originating
bank to add new underlying exposures to the
securitization;
" securitizations of revolving assets where the early
amortization features mimic term structures in that the
risk of the underlying exposures does not return to the
originating bank; and
* securitizations where investors remain fully exposed to
future draws on the underlying exposures even after the
occurrence of early amortization.
A "controlled" early amortization feature will yield lower
capital requirements than an "uncontrolled" one. A controlled
early amortization feature is one that meets all of the following
conditions:
(1) The originating bank has appropriate policies
and procedures to ensure that it has sufficient
capital and liquidity available in the event of an
early amortization;
(2) Throughout the duration of the securitization
(including the early amortization period), there is
the same pro rata sharing of interest, principal,
expenses, losses, fees, recoveries, and other cash
flows from the underlying exposures based on the
originating bank's and the investors' relative shares
of the underlying exposures outstanding measured
on a consistent monthly basis;
(3) The amortization period is sufficient for at least
90[%] of the total underlying exposures outstanding
at the beginning of the early amortization period to
be repaid or recognized as in default; and
(4) The schedule for repayment of investor principal
is not more rapid than would be allowed by straight-
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line amortization over an eighteen-month period.52
Controlled amortization features have generally not been used to
date in the U.S. market.
Concerning asset type, securitizations of balances arising
under uncommitted revolving retail credit facilities (most notably,
credit card receivables) will have a lower conversion factor than
securitizations of other revolving credit facilities (either committed
or non-retail). For uncommitted revolving retail credit facilities,
the Final Rules (like Basel II) build on the fact that most credit
card securitizations require that excess spread be trapped as an
additional credit enhancement for investors if the amount of
excess spread falls below a specified trapping point. If a
transaction does not have this feature, a trapping point of 4.5%
will be used for the calculation below.
Table H - Controlled Early Amortization Provisions
Uncommitted Committed
Retail Credit 3-month average excess spread
Lines Conversion Factor (CF) 90% CF
133.33% of trapping point or more
0% CF
less than 133.33% to 100% of trapping point
1% CF
less than 100% to 75% of trapping point
2% CF
less than 75% to 50% of trapping point
10% CF
less than 50% to 25% of trapping point
20% CF
less than 25% of trapping point
40% CF
Non-retail
Credit 90% CF 90% CF
Lines




Table I - Non-Controlled Early Amortization Provisions
Uncommitted Committed
Retail Credit 3-month average excess spread
Lines Conversion Factor (CF) 100% CF
133.33% of trapping point or more
0% CF
less than 133.33% to 100% of trapping point
5% CF
less than 100% to 75% of trapping point
15% CF
less than 75% to 50% of trapping point
50% CF
less than 50% of trapping point
100% CF
Non-retail
Credit 100% CF 100% CF
Lines
The conversion factor is a function of the relationship
between the three month average excess spread and the trapping
point (or the deemed trapping point of 4.5%). The applicable
conversion factors, depending upon the nature of the securitized
assets and whether or not the early amortization feature is
controlled are set out in Tables H and I above, which appear in the
Adopting Release.53
If a securitization contains a mix of retail and nonretail
exposures or committed and uncommitted exposures, the
originating bank may take a pro rata approach to determining the
risk-based capital requirement, if feasible. Otherwise, the bank
must treat the securitization as a securitization of nonretail
exposures, if it includes any nonretail exposures, and as a
securitization of committed exposures, if it includes any committed
exposures.
53. Id. at 69,374-75.
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5. Credit-Enhancing Representations and Warranties
Consistent with the current U.S. rules, the Final Rules
recognize that one form of recourse relating to securitized assets is
a warranty of collectibility or other representation or warranty that
obligates an originating bank to protect another party from credit
losses on the securitized assets. To differentiate representations
and warranties of this type from standard representations and
warranties designed to assure that a buyer receives assets
consistent with the business understanding, the Final Rules define
the term "credit-enhancing representations and warranties 5 4 and
include credit-enhancing representations and warranties in the
definition of securitization exposure."
Also consistent with the current U.S. rules, the Final Rules
provide a limited carve out from the definition of "credit-
enhancing representations and warranties" for two features that
often appear in mortgage securitizations and whole loan sales in
the secondary market for mortgages: early default clauses and
premium refund clauses. Early default clauses require sellers to
repurchase mortgages that default soon after their origination or
sale. Premium refund clauses require the return of some or all of
the premium (if any) realized by the seller if a mortgage prepays
soon after sale. The Final Rules provide that the following
features are not credit-enhancing representations and warranties:
early default clauses and similar warranties that
permit the return of, or premium refund clauses
that cover, first-lien residential mortgage
exposures for a period not to exceed 120 days
from the date of transfer, provided that the date
of transfer is within one year of origination of
the residential mortgage exposure; and
" premium refund clauses that cover underlying
exposures guaranteed, in whole or in part, by the
U.S. government, a U.S. government agency, or
54. Id. at 69,398 (section 2) (definition of "credit-enhancing representations and
warranties").
55. Id. at 69,404 (section 2) (definintion of "securitization exposure").
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a U.S. government sponsored enterprise,
provided that the clauses are for a period not to
exceedl20 days from the date of transfer.
6. Implicit Recourse
Consistent with Basel II, if a bank provides support to a
securitization beyond the amount of support required by a pre-
existing contractual obligation, then the bank will be required to:
* hold capital against the underlying exposures as if they
had not been securitized;
* deduct any related gain on sale from tier 1 capital; and
* disclose publicly the fact that it provided implicit
support and the regulatory consequences of that action.
The bank's primary supervisor will also have the discretion
to require the first two actions described above with respect to the
16bank's other securitizations.
B. Calculating Risk-Based Capital on Retained Interests
Once a bank, as originator, completes a securitization that
satisfies the general operational requirements and any
requirements relating to particular transaction features, the next
question is how the bank should calculate its risk-based capital on
any interests it retained in the securitized assets. Often in
securitizations the originator realizes a gain on the sale of the
securitized assets, and all or part of the gain results from the
retention by the bank (or its bankruptcy remote subsidiary) of a
subordinated interest-only (or 10) strip which represents the rights
to excess cash flows from the securitized assets after other
securitization exposures have received the cash flows to which they
are entitled. These subordinated 10 strips are referred to in the
Final Rules as "credit-enhancing interest-only strips" (or CEIOs),
and they are subject to special capital requirements. Originators
56. Id. at 69,361, 69,420 (section 42(h)).
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may also retain securitization exposures representing a portion of
the principal balances securitized or non-subordinated 10 strips.
The general securitization hierarchy of approaches to calculating
risk-weighted capital and some other coordinating rules apply to
the capital treatment of these various retained interests.
1. Gain-on-Sale and CEIOs
First, a bank is required to deduct from tier 1 capital any
non-cash, after-tax gain-on-sale resulting from a securitization and
deduct from total capital the portion of any CEIO that does not
constitute gain-on-sale.57 CELOs and any other amounts required
to be deducted from total capital are to be deducted 50% from tier
1 capital and 50% from tier 2 capital. If the portion to be deducted
from tier 2 capital exceeds the bank's tier 2 capital prior to the
deduction, then the excess must be deducted from tier 1 capital. A
bank may calculate any amount required to be deducted from
58
regulatory capital net of any associated deferred tax liabilities.
2. Rated Exposures
Next, a bank is required to apply the RBA to any
remaining retained interests that are externally rated or for which
a rating can be inferred (as described supra Part IV). Unlike
investors, an originating bank must have two external (or inferred)
ratings in order to use the RBA. This extra rating requirement for
originating banks is not present in Basel II, but it is similar to the
existing U.S. rules.59
57. Id. at 69,419 (section 42(a)(1)); see also id. at 69,401 (section 2) (definition of
"gain-on-sale"). Servicing assets, which are somewhat similar to interest only strips,
are not necessarily subject to deduction. They are not specifically addressed by the
Final Rules, but they are covered by the general hierarchy discussed here. They are
excluded from the Market Risk Rules as intangible assets. Market Risk NPR, supra
note 7, at 55,971 (clause (3)(i) of the definition of "covered position").
58. Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 69,419 (section 42(c)).
59. In the current U.S. rules, the two-rating requirement applies to "non-traded




If any retained interests not deducted from capital (as
described supra Part V.B.1) are not eligible for the RBA, then the
bank is required to determine capital using a supervisory formula
approach (or SFA). The SFA works from the sum of (a) the
capital requirement that would apply if the underlying assets were
held directly on the bank's balance sheet plus (b) expected credit
losses (ECL). Using a blend of credit risk modeling and
supervisory judgment, the supervisory formula is very complicated
and requires seven inputs. A bank may not use the SFA for a
particular exposure unless the bank has the ongoing ability to
calculate each of these seven inputs. The seven inputs are:
(1) the amount of the underlying exposures
(UE);
(2) the securitization exposure's proportion of
the tranche in which it resides (TP);
(3) the sum of the risk-based capital requirement
and ECL for the underlying exposures as if they
were held directly on the bank's balance sheet,
divided by the amount of the underlying
exposures (KRB);
(4) the credit enhancement level (L) of the
tranche;
(5) the thickness (T) of the tranche;
(6) the effective number of underlying exposures
(N) 60 in the securitization; and
(7) the exposure-weighted average loss given
default (EWALGD) for the securitization.1
A bank using the SFA would compute the risk-based
capital requirement for an exposure by plugging these inputs into
the formula set out on Exhibit A to this Article. A bank that
cannot use the SFA to calculate the risk-based capital requirement
60. See supra Part IV.
61. See infra Exhibit A.
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for an exposure that would otherwise be subject to the SFA must
instead deduct the position from capital.
This creates an issue for securitizations where the
underlying exposures are not retail, wholesale, equity or
securitization exposures, in that the Agencies have not approved
any method for a bank to calculate K. for exposures that fall
outside of these four categories. The Final Rules fill this gap by
requiring banks to deduct from capital any securitization
exposures where (a) the underlying exposures do not fall in any of
the four regulatory categories, and (b) the exposure does not
qualify for the RBA or the internal assessment approach for
conduit exposures (and has not already been dealt with as gain-on-
sale or CEIO). 62 The Agencies have identified music concert and
film receivables as assets that do not fall in any of the four
categories. 63
Roughly speaking, the SFA places each exposure relating
to a particular securitization on a continuum in terms of the order
in which credit losses on the underlying exposures are absorbed.
This continuum is illustrated in the figure below. The vertical lines
marked T1, T2 and T3 mark the dividing points between the most
subordinated tranche (which absorbs the first losses, from 0 to T1)
the intermediate tranche (absorbing losses from T1 to T2) and the
senior tranche (absorbing only losses in excess of T2). To the
extent that a position falls to the left of KI, a bank that holds that
position is required to hold dollar-for-dollar capital against the
position. To the right of KIR, the capital charge declines rapidly,
until it reaches the capital floor.
62. Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 69,420 (section 42(g)).
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4. Maximum Risk-Based Capital Requirement and Overlap Rules
Since originating banks may have multiple retained
interests in a single securitization, as well as a capital charge
relating to any early amortization feature, there is at least a
theoretical possibility that the sum of the risk-based capital
requirements for these retained interests could exceed K,,, for the
underlying exposures. The Final Rules address this possibility by
applying a cap to an originating bank's risk-based capital
requirements for a particular securitization. The cap equals KRB
for the underlying exposure, 64 but any gain-on-sale or CEIO is
excluded from this cap. The cap also does not apply if any of the
underlying exposure is not a retail, wholesale, equity, or
securitization exposure. The cap is consistent with Basel II and
more favorable to originating banks than the current U.S. capital
rules.
64. Id. at 69,419 (section 42(d)).
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The Final Rules also avoid duplicative capital requirements
for overlapping exposures held by a single bank.65
5. Small Business Rule
As required by a federal statute,66 the current U.S. capital
rules include a special set of more lenient rules for the transfer of
small business loans and leases with recourse by well-capitalized
depository institutions. The Final Rules generally preserve these
more lenient rules,67 which permit a well capitalized bank that sells
small business loan or leases with recourse to hold capital only
against the recourse obligation if the transaction qualifies as a sale
under GAAP and other specified requirements are met.
VI. ABCP CONDUIT EXPOSURES
A. Continued Relief for Conduits Consolidated Under FIN 46
In 2003, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
adopted (and revised) Interpretation No. 46: Consolidation of
Variable Interest Entities (FIN 46). 6' Under FIN 46, many banks
that sponsored multi-seller ABCP conduits would have been
required to consolidate the conduits' assets and liabilities in the
sponsoring bank's financial statements. Some sponsors and
conduits modified their contractual arrangements so that
consolidation was not required, while other sponsors consolidated
one or more conduits. The Agencies did not believe that this
GAAP consolidation of conduits, when applicable, would yield
appropriate risk-based capital treatment of sponsoring banks'
exposures to ABCP conduits. Consequently, the Agencies
adopted rules that permitted sponsoring banks to exclude from
risk-weighted assets any assets of ABCP conduits that the banks
65. Id. at 69,419-20 (section 42(f)).
66. 12 U.S.C. § 1835 (2000) places a cap on the risk-based capital requirement
applicable to a well-capitalized depository institution that transfers small business
loans with recourse.
67. Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 69,420 (section 42(k)).
68. Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., FASB Interpretation No. 46: Consolidation
of Variable Interest Entities (revised Dec. 2003).
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are required to consolidate under FIN 46.69 The Final Rules
continue this exclusion of consolidated conduit assets from a
bank's risk-weighted assets.70 Otherwise, however, the Final Rules
substantially change the risk-based capital rules applying to banks'
ABCP conduit exposures.
B. The End of the Liquidity vs. Credit Enhancement Distinction
For most of their history, bank-sponsored ABCP conduits
have relied upon a distinction drawn in the original Basil Accord
between "commitments" and "direct credit substitutes." Although
the operative definitions of these categories and the details of their
risk-based capital treatment evolved substantially, especially over
the last ten years, commitments have always had a much lower
credit conversion factor (zero through September 2005 and 10%
thereafter for ABCP liquidity commitments with a tenor of one
year or less) than direct credit substitutes (at least 100%).
"Liquidity facilities" provided by banks to conduits can, if properly
structured, qualify as commitments and receive this favorable
capital treatment. The key feature in achieving this treatment is
that true liquidity facilities are conditional; they cannot be drawn
to cover defaults on the assets owned by the conduit.
Most conduits also need some program-wide credit
enhancement, which has been unconditionally available. Bank
facilities that fill this need are virtually always direct credit
substitutes and require much more capital than liquidity
commitments in relation to the amount of the facility. However,
while conventional ABCP conduits generally need liquidity
facilities that cover all of their outstanding commercial paper, the
rating agencies have generally only required partial coverage
(usually 10% or less) by program-wide credit enhancement.
Given the big differences in capital treatment between
liquidity and credit enhancement facilities, the line between these
two categories has been very important and has received a great
69. 68 Fed. Reg. 56,530 (Oct. 1, 2003) (interim final rule); 69 Fed. Reg. 22,382
(Apr. 26, 2004) (extending the effective period of interim final rule); 69 Fed. Reg.
44,908 (July 28, 2004) (final rule).
70. Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 69,420 (section 42(1)).
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deal of regulatory attention. After operating for nearly twenty
years on the basis of less formal guidance, in 2004 the Agencies
adopted eligibility standards for liquidity facilities to continue to
receive favorable capital treatment.7' Implementation issues
relating to those standards led the Agencies to release further
interagency guidance on the topic.72  Basel II also contains
eligibility standards for liquidity facilities, but they apply primarily
to the standardized approach, which is not included in the Final
Rules.73
In a major change from this historical approach, the Final
Rules do not distinguish between true or eligible liquidity, on one
hand, and direct credit substitutes or credit enhancement, on the
other, in terms of the applicable conversion factor or risk weight.
Section 42(e)(2) states:
The amount of an off-balance sheet securitization
exposure that is not an OTC derivative contract
(other than a credit derivative) is the notional
amount of the exposure. For an off-balance-sheet
securitization exposure to an ABCP program, such
as a liquidity facility, the notional amount may be
reduced to the maximum potential amount that the
[bank] could be required to fund given the ABCP
program's current underlying assets (calculated
without regard to the current credit quality of those
assets) .
74
Effectively this applies a 100% credit conversion factor to both
liquidity and credit enhancement facilities, subject to the ability to
reduce the notional amount to the maximum potential funding
amount (which would usually be relevant only for liquidity
71. Id. at 69,419 (section 42(d)).
72. See SR Letter 05-13, Interagency Guidance on the Eligibility of Asset-Backed
Commercial Paper Liquidity Facilities and the Resulting Risk-Based Capital
Treatment (Aug. 4, 2005); see also Letter from the OCC and FRB to the American
Securitization Forum (Mar. 1, 2007).
73. BASEL II, supra note 3, T 578. As indicated above, the Agencies are expected
to propose a U.S. version of the standardized approach in 2008.
74. Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 69,419 (section 42(e)(2)).
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facilities). Any difference in the risk-based capital required for
these facilities under the Final Rule will depend upon other
factors.
This is consistent with the IRB approach under Basel II,
which also generally does not distinguish between eligible liquidity
(in the sense commonly used in the U.S. markets) and credit
enhancement facilities. Basel II does provide a favorable credit
conversion factor for a narrower category of liquidity facilities that
are only available in the event of general market disruption,75 but
the Final Rules do not.
C. Risk-Based Capital Calculations
1. Rated Exposures
Assuming that a bank does not hold any CEIOs or gain-on-
sale relating to conduit assets, the first possible method for
calculating capital relating to an exposure to a conduit is the RBA.
For a bank that sponsors the conduit that benefits from an
exposure, the RBA is only available if the sponsor's actual
exposure (e.g., a liquidity commitment or credit enhancing letter of
credit) has at least two qualifying external ratings, either directly
or by inference (as described supra Part IV). The two-rating
requirement applies because sponsors of conduits fall within the
definition of "originating bank. 76 It appears that only one rating
would be required if the bank analyzing an exposure under the
RBA was not the sponsor of the conduit and did not directly or
7indirectly originate the underlying exposures.
The definition of "ABCP program sponsor" covers banks
that establish the program, approve sellers to, or exposures
purchased by, the program or administer the program by providing
any of a variety of specified services.78 Merely providing a liquidity
facility to a program does not appear to make a bank a "sponsor."
75. BASEL II, supra note 3, 580, 638.
76. Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 69,403 (section 2) (definition of
"originating bank").
77. Id.
78. Id. The specified services include underwriting or placing the ABCP, which
has generally been seen by the market as a function separate from the sponsor.
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This differs from Basel II, which indicates that a bank "would
generally be considered a sponsor" if the bank provides any of a
variety of services or facilities, including "liquidity
enhancements. ,79
The Final Rules provide some specific guidance on
applying the RBA to a liquidity facility. The definition of "senior
securitization exposure" (which is relevant in determining which
column in the RBA risk weight table to use) states:
Both the most senior commercial paper issued by an
ABCP program and a liquidity facility that supports
the ABCP program may be senior securitization
exposures if the liquidity facility provider's right to
reimbursement of the drawn amounts is senior to all
claims on the cash flows from the underlying
exposures except amounts due under interest rate or
currency derivative contracts, fees due, or other
similar payments.80
This guidance differs from Basel II, which says the following about
the seniority of liquidity facilities:
Usually a liquidity facility supporting an ABCP
programme would not be the most senior position
within the programme; the commercial paper, which
benefits from the liquidity support, typically would
be the most senior position. However, if the
liquidity facility is sized to cover all of the
outstanding commercial paper, it can be viewed as
covering all losses on the underlying receivables
pool that exceed the amount of over-
collateralisation/reserves provided by the seller and
as being most senior. 81
79. BASEL II, supra note 3, 543(b).
80. Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 69,404 (section 2) (definition of "senior
securitization exposure").
81. BASEL II, supra note 3, 613(c).
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The U.S. guidance is more favorable to banks than at least the first
sentence above, and better reflects the application of the general
concept of "senior securitization exposure" to liquidity facilities in
the U.S. market.
The Adopting Release provides additional interpretive
guidance relating to the application of the definition of "external
rating" to a liquidity facility. To qualify as an "external rating" for
the RBA, a rating must "fully reflect[] the entire amount of credit
risk with regard to all payments owed to the holder of the
exposure. ''82 However:
A commenter asked whether the applicable
NRSRO 83 rating criteria must cover all contractual
payments owed to the bank holding the exposure, or
only contractual principal and interest. For
example, liquidity facilities typically obligate the
seller to make certain future fee and indemnity
payments directly to the liquidity bank. These
ancillary obligations, however, are not an exposure
to the ABCP program and would not normally be
covered by NRSRO rating criteria, which focus on
the risks of the underlying assets and the exposure's
vulnerability to those risks. The agencies agree that
such ancillary obligations of the seller need not be
covered by the applicable NRSRO rating criteria for
an exposure to be eligible for the IAA.84
2. Internal Assessment Approach
Traditionally, most liquidity and credit enhancement
facilities for ABCP conduits have not received external ratings or
been senior to positions from which ratings could be inferred. This
would have tended to push ABCP exposures into the SFA, but
banks that are active in this market were concerned that they often
82. Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 69,401 (definition of "external rating").
83. NRSRO stands for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization.
84. Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 69,365. IAA stands for Internal
Assessments Approach.
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would not have sufficient information to calculate capital
requirements using that approach." In response, the Agencies,
which have generally tried to accommodate banks' participation in
this market, added an IAA to Basel II and the Final Rules. The
IAA permits a bank to set the risk-based capital for conduit-
related exposures based on the bank's internal assessment of the
credit quality of the exposure. These internal assessments must
map to ratings issued by external rating agencies.
A bank wishing to use the IAA must receive approval from
its primary federal supervisor, in a process separate from overall
approval to implement the new risk-based capital rules. The
specific ABCP program must also qualify, and the bank must have
initially assessed the exposure under consideration as at least
investment grade. The eligibility criteria for banks and programs
are set out in Section 44(a) 86 and summarized infra. A bank that
elects to use the IAA for any securitization exposures must use the
IAA for all exposures that are eligible for the IAA.
To use the IAA, a bank must demonstrate to its primary
federal supervisor that:
(i) The bank's credit assessments of securitization
exposures are based on publicly available rating
criteria used by one or more of the major external
credit rating agencies and are consistent with those
used in the bank's internal risk management
process, management information reporting systems
and capital adequacy assessment process.
(ii) The bank's assessment process identifies
gradations of risk, and each of the bank's
85. Nevertheless, in the hierarchy of approaches, if a bank does not qualify to use
the IAA on a particular exposure, and the exposure is not eligible for the RBA, then
the bank may use the SFA on the exposure if the bank has the ability to calculate the
necessary inputs on an ongoing basis. See supra Part V.B.3. In applying the SFA to a
conduit exposure, a bank may use the special rules applicable to purchased wholesale
receivables, where otherwise applicable. Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 69,400
(section 2) (definition of "eligible purchased wholesale receivable"); id. at 69,409
(section 31).




assessment categories corresponds to a rating
category used by one or more of the major rating
agencies.
(iii) The bank's assessment process, particularly the
stress test factors used to set credit enhancement, is
at least as conservative as the most conservative of
the publicly available criteria of the agencies that
rate the commercial paper issued by the subject
program. If there is a split between two or more
agencies that rate the ABCP, the bank must use the
stress factor that requires the most credit
enhancement. If one of the rating agencies changes
its methodology, the bank must use the revised
methodology to evaluate whether the bank's
internal assessments should be revised.
(iv) The bank has an effective system of controls
and oversight and an independent internal audit
function that assesses the controls at least annually.
(v) The bank reviews and updates its internal
assessments as new material information becomes
available and at least annually.
(vi) The bank validates its assessment process on an
ongoing basis and at least annually. 7
The Adopting Release clarifies that the reference to publicly
available rating criteria in the IAA eligibility criteria
does not mean that these criteria must be published
formally by the NRSRO. While the agencies expect
banks to rely on published rating criteria when these
criteria are available, an NRSRO often delays
publication of rating criteria for securitizations
87. Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 69,421-22 (section 44(a)).
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involving new asset types until the NRSRO builds
sufficient experience with such assets. Similarly, as
securitization structures evolve over time, published
criteria may be revised with some lag. Especially for
securitizations involving new structures or asset
types, the requirement that rating criteria be
publicly available should be interpreted broadly to
encompass not only published criteria, but also
criteria that are obtained through written
correspondence or other communications with an
NRSRO. In such cases, these communications
should be documented and available for review by
the bank's primary Federal supervisor. The
[A]gencies believe this flexibility is appropriate only
for unique situations when published rating criteria
are not generally applicable.88
The Final Rules permit banks to apply the IAA to
exposures relating to securitizations of assets that are not retail,
wholesale, equity, or securitization exposures (non-IRB secur-
itization exposures). Banks are required to deduct from capital all
non-IRB securitization exposures unless the exposure qualifies for
the RBA or the IAA.89
The eligibility criteria relating to ABCP programs require
that all ABCP issued by the program must have an external rating.
In addition, the subject securitization exposure must meet the
following eligibility criteria: (A) the bank initially rated the
exposure at least the equivalent of investment grade; (B) the
ABCP program has robust credit and investment guidelines for the
underlying exposures; (C) the ABCP program performs a detailed
credit analysis of the sellers of the exposures underlying the
securitization exposure; (D) the ABCP program's underwriting
policy for the exposures underlying the securitization exposure
establishes minimum asset eligibility criteria that include the
prohibition of the purchase of assets that are significantly past due
88. Id. at 69,365.
89. Id. at 69,420 (section 42(g)).
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or of assets that are defaulted, as well as limitations on
concentration to individual obligors or geographic areas and the
tenor of the assets to be purchased; (E) the aggregate estimate of
loss on the exposures underlying the securitization exposure
considers all sources of potential risk, such as credit and dilution
risk; and (F) where relevant, the ABCP program incorporates
structural features into each purchase of exposures underlying the
securitization exposure to mitigate potential credit deterioration of
the underlying exposures.9O
The Adopting Release indicates that the criterion
prohibiting purchase of assets that are defaulted or significantly
past due would be met if:
the ABCP program does not fund underlying assets
that are significantly past due or defaulted when
placed into the program (that is, the program's
advance rate against such assets is 0 percent) and
the securitization exposure is not subject to
potential losses associated with these assets. The
agencies observe that the rule does not set a specific
number-of-days-past due criterion. In addition, the
term 'defaulted assets' in [this] criterion [] does not
refer to the wholesale and retail definitions of
default in the final rule, but rather may be
interpreted as referring to assets that have been
charged off or written down by the seller prior to
being placed into the ABCP program or to assets
that would be charged off or written down under the
program's governing contracts. 9
3. Other Approaches
If a conduit exposure is not eligible for the RBA, and the
bank is not able to use the IAA or the SFA to calculate the capital
requirement for the exposure, then the bank must deduct the
90. Id. at 69,422 (section 42(a)(2)-(3)).
91. Id. at 69,366.
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amount of the exposure from capital. The Final Rules do not
include a fall-back approach permitted by Basel II, which states
that "on an exceptional basis and subject to supervisory consent,"
a bank may temporarily:
" apply to a liquidity facility the highest risk weight
assigned under the standardized approach to any of the
underlying individual exposures; and
* apply a credit conversion factor of (a) 50% for an
eligible liquidity facility with an original maturity of one
year or less, (b) 100% for an eligible liquidity with an
original maturity of more than one year and (c) 20% for
a facility that is only available in the case of general
market disruption.
4. Calculation Rules
The definition of "amount" for securitization exposures
states that, for a commitment, such as a liquidity facility extended
to an ABCP program, "the notional amount may be reduced to
the maximum potential amount that the [bank] could be required
to fund" under the arrangement's documentation "calculated
without regard to the current credit quality of those assets[]." 93
The Final Rules also avoid duplicative capital requirements on
overlapping exposures held by the same bank and relating to a
single conduit. The sum of the commitments under the liquidity
and credit enhancement facilities extended to a conduit commonly
exceed the amount of commercial paper outstanding. When this
happens, a bank that has overlapping exposures "is not required to
hold duplicative risk-based capital against the overlapping
position. Instead, the [bank] may apply to the overlapping position
the applicable risk-based capital treatment that results in the
highest risk-based capital requirement., 94 This only applies when a
single bank has overlapping exposures. If two separate banks have
92. BASEL II, supra note 3, 639.
93. Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 69,419 (section 42(e)(2)).
94. Id. at 69,419-20 (section 42(f)).
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overlapping exposures, each calculates its risk-based capital
requirement without reference to the other exposure.
5. Exclusion from Market Risk Rules
Consistent with the current U.S. capital rules, the proposed
Market Risk Rules exclude "[a]ny position that, in form or
substance, acts as a liquidity facility that provides support to
[ABCP]." 95 Capital for these facilities must be determined under
the credit risk-based standards in the Final Rules.
VII. CREDIT RISK MITIGATION
The credit risk mitigation (CRM) rules in Basel II and the
Final Rules regulate the impact that guaranties and financial
collateral have on the risk-based capital requirements associated
with an exposure. The CRM rules for securitization exposures
differ from the rules for retail and wholesale exposures because
the CRM rules for retail and wholesale exposures permit banks to
substitute or adjust risk parameters of the underlying exposure
based on eligible CRM. Since banks are not permitted to estimate
risk parameters for securitization exposures, the retail and
wholesale approach would not fit securitization exposures.
A. Scope - Wrapped Deals and the RBA
The CRM rules do not apply to possibly the most common
transaction structure where investors in securitization exposures
rely on a guarantee. If a securitization exposure is rated in part
based on a surety bond or other guarantee (as would be the case in
"wrapped" deals), then a bank will calculate the risk-based capital
required for that exposure using the RBA and the actual rating of
the transaction.96 Since the rating depends in part on the wrap, this
capital treatment implicitly gives effect to the wrap as CRM
without requiring (or permitting) an investor to go through the
95. Market Risk NPR, supra note 7, at 55,971 (section 2) (clause (3)(iii) of the
definition of "covered position").
96. Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 69,370.
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CRM rules. The flip side of this approach is that a bank cannot
double count the CRM by seeking to apply the CRM rules to
further reduce the risk-based capital requirement for an exposure
of this type. If the CRM is reflected in the rating that drives the
RBA capital treatment, the same CRM may not also be used to
reduce the capital requirement derived from the RBA.9 '
In addition, the Adopting Release notes that:
if a bank purchases an asset-backed security issued
by a securitization SPE and purchases a credit
derivative to protect itself from credit losses
associated with the asset-backed security, the
purchase of the credit derivative by the investing
bank does not turn the traditional securitization into
a synthetic securitization. Instead, the investing
bank would be viewed as having purchased a
traditional securitization exposure and would reflect
the CRM benefits of the credit derivative through
the securitization CRM rules ... 98
If a bank provided a credit derivative or guarantee in the scenario
described above, that credit derivative or guarantee would also be
a securitization exposure.
B. Financial Collateral
The Final Rules and Basel II treat collateral and guaranties
separately. This is important for synthetic securitizations.
Although SPEs are not eligible guarantors for CRM purposes, an
undertaking by an SPE can be used for CRM if the SPE's
obligations are collateralized with recognized collateral. The only
collateral that will be recognized for CRM purposes is "financial
collateral," which is defined as cash, gold bullion, conforming
residential mortgages, and specified types of marketable
securities. 99
97. Id. at 69,424 (section 46(a)). The same principles apply under the IAA.
98. Id. at 69,327.
99. Id. at 69,401 (section 2) (definition of "financial collateral"). Non-financial
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The risk-based capital requirement for a securitization
exposure that is collateralized with financial collateral is
determined by multiplying the risk-based capital requirement for
the exposure without giving effect to the collateral times a factor
that takes into account the current market value of the collateral
and haircuts for market price volatility and (if applicable) foreign
exchange volatility.' °° With prior regulatory approval, a bank may
calculate its own haircuts. Otherwise, the Final Rule provides
standard supervisory haircuts.
C. Eligible Guarantors, Guaranties and Credit Derivatives
To be eligible as CRM, a guarantee or credit derivative
must be issued by an eligible securitization guarantor and must
satisfy the additional requirements specified below. Eligible
securitization guarantor is defined to include:
(i) sovereign entities, some international organ-
izations, the Federal Home Loan Banks, Farmer
Mac, multi-lateral development banks, domestic and
foreign banks, bank holding companies, some savings
and loan holding companies and securities firms; and
(ii) other entities (excluding SPEs) that have either
(A) unsecured long-term debt ratings not lower than
the A category or (B) a PD assigned by the bank
under the rules for wholesale exposures that equates
to at least the A category.101
The additional requirements for a guarantee are that the
guarantee must be in writing, must cover all or a pro rata portion
of all contractual payments of the obligor on the reference
collateral for individual underlying exposures may be given effect in determining the
risk-based capital requirement for a securitization exposure prior to application of
any CRM. If the RBA applies, the applicable rating agencies may consider the
availability of collateral in setting credit enhancement levels. If the IAA applies, the
sponsoring bank will follow rating agency criteria in considering the availability of
collateral. If the SFA applies, the availability of collateral may affect the calculation
of KRB.
100. Id. at 69,424 (section 46(b)).
101. Id. at 69,400 (section 2) (definition of "eligible securitization guarantor").
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exposure and must be unconditional and (except for breach of
contract by the beneficiary) non-cancelable. It also must give the
beneficiary a direct claim against the guarantor, must be legally
enforceable in a jurisdiction where the guarantor has sufficient
assets against which a judgment may be attached and enforced,
and must require the guarantor to pay the beneficiary upon the
obligor's default without first requiring the beneficiary to demand
payment from the obligor. Finally, it must not increase the
beneficiary's cost of credit protection in response to deterioration
in the credit quality of the reference exposure and may not be
provided by an affiliate of the bank, other than certain affiliates
that are insured depository institutions, banks, securities brokers
or dealers, or insurance companies.
A credit derivative must satisfy the eligible guarantee
requirements described in the preceding paragraph and must be in
the form of a credit default swap, nth-to-default swap, total return
swap or other form approved by the applicable Agency. For credit
default swaps and nth-to-default swaps, the contract must include
failure to pay and insolvency credit events, must state who is
responsible for determining if a credit event has occurred (which
may not be the sole responsibility of the protection provider), and
must give the protection purchaser the right to notify the
protection provider of the occurrence of a credit event. For total
return swaps, if the bank records net swap payments received as
net income, the bank must also record offsetting deterioration in
the value of the hedged exposure (either through reductions in fair
value or by an addition to reserves). The eligibility standards also
impose requirements as to the confirmation of the swap and any
assignments by relevant parties and the terms and conditions of
settlement.
10 2
A bank that obtains an eligible credit derivative or other
eligible guarantee from an eligible securitization guarantor may
adjust the risk-based capital requirement for the covered
securitization exposure as follows. To the extent of the notional
amount of the derivative or guarantee, the bank may substitute the
risk-weighted asset amount of a direct exposure to the eligible
102. Id. at 69,399 (section 2) (definition of "eligible credit derivative").
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securitization guarantor for the risk-weighted asset amount of the
securitization exposure. To the extent that the protection amount
is less than the amount of the securitization exposure, the bank
must continue to hold risk-based capital on the uncovered portion
of the securitization exposure in an amount proportional to the
total risk-based capital requirement for the exposure prior to
application of the CRM rules.
The general treatment of CRM in the Final Rules requires
adjustments to risk-based capital if (a) there is a maturity or
currency mismatch between a guarantee or credit derivative and
the hedged exposure or (b) a credit derivative used as CRM does
not include a credit event trigger based on specified types of
restructurings of the hedged exposure. °3  The rules for
securitization CRM incorporate these requirements.' 1
The presence of an eligible guarantee or eligible credit
derivative will never increase the capital requirement for a
securitization exposure. If the capital requirement calculated
giving effect to the guarantee or credit derivative is greater than
the capital requirement for the exposure without the guarantee or
derivative, then the bank is permitted to disregard the guarantee
or derivative. 10 When a bank recognizes a guarantee or derivative
in calculating its capital requirement for a securitization exposure,
the bank is also required to calculate the expected credit loss for
the exposure using the same risk parameters and add that ECL to
the bank's total ECL.
VIII. SYNTHETIC SECURITIZATIONS
The Final Rules generally treat synthetic securitizations
like traditional securitizations. Most provisions apply to
securitization exposures neutrally, without regard to whether the
exposure arises from a traditional or synthetic securitization.
However, additional rules apply to synthetic securitizations, in part
because of the importance of CRM in synthetic securitizations.
The Adopting Release describes the interaction between the
103. Id. at 69,417 (section 33(d)-(f)).
104. Id. at 69,425 (section 46(c)(4)).
105. NPR, supra note 4, at 55,891.
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securitization rules and CRM rules in the context of synthetic
securitizations as follows:
Although synthetic securitizations typically employ
credit derivatives, which might suggest that such
transactions would be subject to the CRM rules in
section 33 of the final rule, banks must apply the
securitization framework when calculating risk-based
capital requirements for a synthetic securitization
exposure. Banks may ultimately be redirected to the
securitization CRM rules to adjust the securitization
framework capital requirement for an exposure to
reflect the CRM technique used in the transaction.1°6
D. Operational Requirements
The operational requirements for synthetic securitizations
are more detailed than those for traditional securitizations. These
requirements are generally consistent with Basel II and are
"intended to ensure that the originating bank has truly transferred
credit risk of the underlying exposures to one or more third-party
protection providers."' 7 The requirements, which must be met in
order for an originating bank to reduce its risk-based capital, are:
(i) The credit risk mitigant is financial collateral, an
eligible credit derivative from an eligible
securitization guarantor, or an eligible guarantee
from an eligible securitization guarantor.
(ii) The bank transfers credit risk associated with the
underlying exposures to third-party investors, and
the terms and conditions in the credit risk mitigants
employed do not include provisions that:
(A) Allow for the termination of the credit
protection due to deterioration in the credit
quality of the underlying exposures;
(B) Require the bank to alter or replace the




underlying exposures to improve the credit
quality of the underlying exposures;
(C) Increase the bank's cost of credit protection
in response to deterioration in the credit quality
of the underlying exposures;
(D) Increase the yield payable to parties other
than the bank in response to a deterioration in
the credit quality of the underlying exposures; or
(E) Provide for increases in a retained first loss
position or credit enhancement provided by the
bank after the inception of the securitization.
(iii) The bank obtains a well-reasoned opinion from
legal counsel that confirms the enforceability of the
credit risk mitigant in all relevant jurisdictions.
(iv) Any clean-up calls relating to the securitization
satisfy the requirements discussed supra Part
III.A.3.' °
Although failure to meet these requirements will prevent
the originating bank from reducing its risk-based capital
requirements based on a synthetic securitization, the Adopting
Release states that a bank that provides credit protection in a
synthetic securitization "must use the securitization framework to
compute risk-based capital requirements for its exposures to the
synthetic securitization even if the originating bank failed to meet
one or more of the operational requirements for a synthetic
securitization."109
E. Calculation of Risk-Based Capital Requirements
Since synthetic securitizations do not result in gain-on-sale
and generally do not create CEIOs, the first step in the hierarchy
applicable to synthetic securitizations is the RBA. As with
traditional securitizations, two external or inferred ratings are
required for the originating bank to use the RBA, but an investing
bank would need only one. For originating banks, this would
108. Id. at 69,372.
109. Id.
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generally apply to a retained "super senior" tranche, which often
has inferred ratings.
If the RBA does not apply to an exposure to a synthetic
securitization, the bank would apply the SFA, if both the bank and
the exposure qualify to use the SFA. The SFA would be applied
without considering any CRM provided through the synthetic
securitization. Then the bank would apply the CRM rules to
reduce its risk-based capital requirement based upon any such
CRM. If the bank or the exposure does not qualify for the SFA,
then the bank would be required to deduct the position from
capital. The same would be true for any portion of an exposure
covered by the SFA that was at or below K.. This would
generally apply to the first-loss tranche.
Typically, the originating bank in a synthetic securitization
obtains credit protection on a mezzanine tranche. The credit
protection may take one of two forms: (a) a credit default swap or
financial guarantee from another financial institution; or (b)
similar protection from an SPE that provides financial collateral
for its protection obligations. In situation (a), assuming the
protection provider is an eligible securitization guarantor, the
originating bank would calculate its risk-based capital requirement
as described supra Part VII.C. In situation (b), the bank would
first use the SFA to calculate its risk-based capital requirement on
the mezzanine tranche, without giving effect to the CRM and then
apply the securitization CRM rules to adjust the capital
requirement based on the availability of the financial collateral.
F. Nth to Default Credit Derivatives
The Final Rules provide a simplified method to calculate
the risk-based capital effects of a credit derivative that provides
credit protection only for the nth reference exposure that defaults
in a specified group of reference exposures, which are referred to
as "nth to default credit derivatives." The treatment varies for 1St to
default credit derivatives vs. other nth to default credit derivatives.
The risk-based capital treatment for banks that obtain or provide
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credit protection using these derivatives is summarized in the table
below: °
I' to default credit derivative Other nth to default credit
derivatives
Protection Derivative is treated as No risk-based capital
purchaser covering only the reference reduction unless either (a)
exposure with the lowest bank has also obtained
risk-based capital credit protection on
requirement. Securitization exposures 1 through (n-i)
CRM rules are applied to to default or (b) exposures
that exposure. 1 through (n-i) have
already defaulted.
Protection Use RBA if applicable. Use RBA if applicable.
provider Otherwise, risk-weighted Otherwise, risk -weighted
asset amount equals (a) asset amount equals (a)
notional amount of notional amount of
derivative, times (b) 12.5, derivative, times (b) 12.5,
times (c) the sum of the times (c) the sum of the
risk-based capital risk-based capital
requirements for all of the requirements for all of the
underlying exposures (but underlying exposures,
this clause (c) is limited to excluding the n-1 exposures
100%). with the lowest risk-based
capital requirements (and
this clause (c) is limited to
100%).
110. Id. at 69,420 (section 42(m)),
2008]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
EXHIBIT A
Supervisory Formula"'
The SFA capital requirement for a securitization exposure
is UE multiplied by TP multiplied by the greater of (i) 0.0056*T;








(i - K IRB(vi) c-
1-h
(vii) g- -c) 
1
f
(viii, (v + KIRB2
1-h
+ (1 - KIRB) K 1R - v
(1- h) .1000
(EWALGD - K 1RB) + .25. (1 - EWALGD)(ix) v=K l6 N
111. Excerpted from Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 69,366-67.
when Y < KI"
when Y > KIRB
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In these expressions, [Y; a, b] refers to the cumulative beta
distribution with parameters a and b evaluated at Y. In the case
where N=1 and EWALGD=100 percent, S[Y] in formula (1) must
be calculated with K[Y] set equal to the product of KIRB and Y, and
d set equal to 1 - KRB .

